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Abstract—Targeted social engineering attacks in the form of
spear phishing emails, are often the main gimmick used by
attackers to infiltrate organizational networks and implant state-
of-the-art Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs). Spear phishing
is a complex targeted attack in which, an attacker harvests
information about the victim prior to the attack. This infor-
mation is then used to create sophisticated, genuine-looking
attack vectors, drawing the victim to compromise confidential
information. What makes spear phishing different, and more
powerful than normal phishing, is this contextual information
about the victim. Online social media services can be one such
source for gathering vital information about an individual. In
this paper, we characterize and examine a true positive dataset
of spear phishing, spam, and normal phishing emails from
Symantec’s enterprise email scanning service. We then present
a model to detect spear phishing emails sent to employees of
14 international organizations, by using social features extracted
from LinkedIn. Our dataset consists of 4,742 targeted attack
emails sent to 2,434 victims, and 9,353 non targeted attack emails
sent to 5,912 non victims; and publicly available information from
their LinkedIn profiles. We applied various machine learning
algorithms to this labeled data, and achieved an overall maximum
accuracy of 97.76% in identifying spear phishing emails. We
used a combination of social features from LinkedIn profiles,
and stylometric features extracted from email subjects, bodies,
and attachments. However, we achieved a slightly better accuracy
of 98.28% without the social features. Our analysis revealed that
social features extracted from LinkedIn do not help in identifying
spear phishing emails. To the best of our knowledge, this is one
of the first attempts to make use of a combination of stylometric
features extracted from emails, and social features extracted from
an online social network to detect targeted spear phishing emails.
I. INTRODUCTION
A new race of insidious threats called Advanced Persistent
Threats (APTs) have joined the league of eCrime activities
on the Internet, and caught a lot of organizations off guard
in the fairly recent times. Critical infrastructures and the
governments, corporations, and individuals supporting them
are under attack by these increasingly sophisticated cyber
threats. The goal of the attackers is to gain access to intellectual
property, personally identifiable information, financial data,
and targeted strategic information. This is not simple fraud
or hacking, but intellectual property theft and infrastructure
corruption on a grand scale [7]. APTs use multiple attack
techniques and vectors that are conducted by stealth to avoid
detection, so that hackers can retain control over target systems
unnoticed for long periods of time. Interestingly, no matter how
sophisticated these attack vectors may be, the most common
ways of getting them inside an organization’s network are
social engineering attacks like phishing, and targeted spear
phishing emails. There have been numerous reports of spear
phishing attacks causing losses of millions of dollars in the
recent past. 1 2 Although there exist antivirus, and other similar
protection software to mitigate such attacks, it is always better
to stop such vectors at the entry level itself [21]. This requires
sophisticated techniques to deter spear phishing attacks, and
identify malicious emails at a very early stage itself.
In this research paper, we focus on identifying such spear
phishing emails, wherein the attacker targets an individual or
company, instead of anyone in general. Spear phishing emails
ususally contain victim-specific context instead of general
content. Since it is targeted, a spear phishing attack looks
much more realistic, and thus, harder to detect [16]. A typical
spear phishing attack can broadly be broken down into two
phases. In the first phase, the attacker tries to gather as much
information about the victim as possible, in order to craft a
scenario which looks realistic, is believable for the victim,
and makes it very easy for the attacker to attain the victim’s
trust. In the second phase, the attacker makes use of this
gained trust, and draws the victim into giving out sensitive
/ confidential information like a user name, password, bank
account details, credit card details, etc. The attacker can also
exploit the victim’s trust by infecting the victim’s system,
through luring them into downloading and opening malicious
attachments [16]. While spear phishing may be a timeworn
technique, it continues to be effective even in today’s Web 2.0
landscape. A very recent example of such a spear phishing
attack was reported by FireEye. Here, attackers exploited
the news of the disappearance of Malaysian Airlines Flight
MH370, to lure government officials across the world into
opening malicious attachments (Figure 1) sent to them over
email [25]. In 2011, security firm RSA suffered a breach via
a targeted attack; analysis revealed that the compromise began
with the opening of a spear phishing email. 3 That same year,
email service provider Epsilon also fell prey to a spear phishing
attack that caused the organization to lose an estimated US$4
billion. 4 These examples indicate that spear phishing has been,
and continues to be one of the biggest forms of eCrime over
the past few years, especially in terms of the monetary losses
incurred.
1http://businesstech.co.za/news/internet/56731/south-africas-3-billion-
phishing-bill/
2http://www.scmagazine.com/stolen-certificates-used-to-deliver-trojans-in-
spear-phishing-campaign/article/345626/
3http://blogs.rsa.com/rivner/anatomy-of-an-attack/
4http://www.net-security.org/secworld.php?id=10966
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Fig. 1. Example of a malicious PDF attachment sent via a spear phishing
email. The PDF attachment was said to contain information about the missing
Malaysian Airlines Flight 370.
Spear phishing was first studied as context aware phishing
by Jakobsson et al. in 2005 [15]. A couple of years later,
Jagatic et al. performed a controlled experiment and found that
the number of victims who fell for context aware phishing /
spear phishing is 4.5 times the number of victims who fell
for general phishing [14]. This work was preliminary proof
that spear phishing attacks have a much higher success rate
than normal phishing attacks. It also highlighted that, what
separates a regular phishing attack from a spear phishing
attack is the additional information / context. Online social
media services like LinkedIn, which provide rich professional
information about individuals, can be one such source for
extracting contextual information, which can be used against
a victim. Recently, the FBI also warned that spear phishing
emails typically contain accurate information about victims
often obtained from data posted on social networking sites,
blogs or other websites. 5 In this work, we investigate if
publicly available information from LinkedIn can help in
differentiating a spear phishing from a non spear phishing
email received by an individual. We attained a dataset of
true positive targeted spear phishing emails, and a dataset of
a mixture of non targeted, spam and phishing attack emails
from the Symantec’s enterprise email scanning service, which
is deployed at multiple international organizations around the
world. To conduct the analysis at the organizational level,
we extracted the most frequently occurring domains from the
“to” fields of these emails, and filtered out 14 most targeted
organizations, where the first name and last name could be
derived from the email address. Our final dataset consisted of
4,742 spear phishing emails sent to 2,434 unique employees,
and 9,353 non targeted spam / phishing emails to 5,914 unique
employees. For a more exhaustive analysis, we also used a
random sample of 6,601 benign emails from the Enron email
dataset [6] sent to 1,240 unique employees with LinkedIn
profiles.
We applied 4 classification algorithms, and were able to
achieve a maximum accuracy of 97.04% for classifying spear
phishing, and non spear phishing emails using a combination
5http://www.computerweekly.com/news/2240187487/FBI-warns-of-
increased-spear-phishing-attacks
of email features, and social features. However, without the
social features, we were able to achieve a slightly higher
accuracy of 98.28% for classifying these emails. We then
looked at the most informative features, and found that email
features performed better than social features at differentiating
targeted spear phishing emails from non targeted spam /
phishing emails, and benign Enron emails. To the best of
our knowledge, this is the first attempt at making use of a
social media profile of a user to distinguish targeted spear
phishing emails from non targeted attack emails, received by
her. Having found that social features extracted from LinkedIn
profiles do not help in distinguishing spear phishing and non
spear phishing emails, our results encourage to explore other
social media services like Facebook, and Twitter. Such studies
can be particularly helpful in mitigating APTs, and reducing
the chances of attacks to an organization at the entry level
itself.
The rest of the paper is arranged as follows. Section II
discuss the related work, Section III describes our email and
LinkedIn profile datasets, and the data collection methodology.
The analysis and results are described in Section IV. We con-
clude our findings, and discuss the limitations, contributions,
and scope for future work in Section V.
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
The concept of targeted phishing was first introduced
in 2005 as social phishing or context-aware phishing [15].
Authors of this work argued that if the attacker can infer or
manipulate the context of the victim before the attack, this
context can be used to make the victim volunteer the target
information. This theory was followed up with an experiment
where Jagatic et al. harvested freely available acquaintance
data of a group of Indiana University students, by crawling
social networking websites like Facebook, LinkedIn, MySpace,
Orkut etc. [14]. This contextual information was used to launch
an actual (but harmless) phishing attack targeting students
between the age group of 18-24 years. Their results indicated
about 4.5 times increase in the number of students who fell
for the attack which made use of contextual information, than
the generic phishing attack. However, authors of this work
do not provide details of the kind and amount of information
they were able to gather from social media websites about the
victims.
a) Who falls for phish: Dhamija et al. provided the
first empirical evidence about which malicious strategies are
successful at deceiving general users [8]. Kumaraguru et al.
conducted a series of studies and experiments on creating
and evaluating techniques for teaching people not to fall for
phish [19], [20], [21]. Lee studied data from Symantec’s
enterprise email scanning service, and calculated the odds ratio
of being attacked for these users, based on their area of work.
The results of this work indicated that users with subjects
“Social studies”, and “Eastern, Asiatic, African, American
and Australasian Languages, Literature and Related Subjects”
were both positively correlated with targeted attacks at more
than 95% confidence [22]. Sheng et al. conducted an online
survey with 1,001 participants to study who is more susceptible
to phishing based on demographics. Their results indicated
that women are more susceptible than men to phishing, and
participants between the ages 18 and 25 are more susceptible
to phishing than other age groups [27]. In similar work, Halevi
et al. found a strong correlation between gender and response
to a prize phishing email. They also found that neuroticism is
the factor most correlated to responding to the email. Interest-
ingly, authors detected no correlation between the participants’
estimate of being vulnerable to phishing attacks and actually
being phished. This suggests susceptibility to phishing is not
due to lack of awareness of the phishing risks, and that real-
time response to phishing is hard to predict in advance by
online users [10].
b) Phishing email detection techniques: To keep this
work focused, we concentrate only on techniques proposed for
detecting phishing emails; we do not cover all the techniques
used for detecting phishing URLs or phishing websites in gen-
eral. Abu-Nimeh et al. [2] studied the performance of different
classifiers used in text mining such as Logistic regression,
classification and regression trees, Bayesian additive regression
trees, Support Vector Machines, Random forests, and Neural
networks. Their dataset consisted of a public collection of
about 1,700 phishing mails, and 1,700 legitimate mails from
private mailboxes. They focused on richness of word to classify
phishing email based on 43 keywords. The features represent
the frequency of “bag-of-words” that appear in phishing and
legitimate emails. However, the ever-evolving techniques and
language used in phishing emails might make it hard for this
approach to be effective over a long period of time.
Various feature selection approaches have also been re-
cently introduced to assist phishing detection. A lot of previous
work [2], [4], [9] has focused on email content in order to clas-
sify the emails as either benign or malicious. Chandrasekaran
et al. [4] presented an approach based on natural structural
characteristics in emails. The features included number of
words in the email, the vocabulary, the structure of the subject
line, and the presence of 18 keywords. They tested on 400 data
points which were divided into five sets with different type
of feature selection. Their results were the best when more
features were used to classify phishing emails using Support
Vector Machine. Authors of this work proposed a rich set of
stylometric features, but the dataset they used was very small
as compared to a lot of other similar work. Fette et al. [9] on
the other hand, considered 10 features which mostly examine
URL and presence of JavaScript to flag emails as phishing.
Nine features were extracted from the email and the last feature
was obtained from WHOIS query. They followed a similar
approach as Chandrasekaran et al. but using larger datasets,
about 7,000 normal emails and 860 phishing emails. Their
filter scored 97.6% F-measure, false positive rate of 0.13%
and a false negative rate of 3.6%. The heavy dependence on
URL based features, however, makes this approach ineffective
for detecting phishing emails which do not contain a URL,
or are attachment based attacks, or ask the user to reply to
the phishing email with potentially sensitive information. URL
based features were also used by Chhabra et al. to detect
phishing using short URLs [5]. Their work, however, was
limited to only URLs, and did not cover phishing through
emails. Islam and Abawajy [13] proposed a multi-tier phishing
detection and filtering approach. They also proposed a method
for extracting the features of phishing email based on weights
of message content and message header. The results of their
experiments showed that the proposed algorithm reduces the
false positive problems substantially with lower complexity.
Behavior-based approaches have also been proposed by
various researchers to determine phishing messages [28], [29].
Zhang et al. [29] worked on detecting abnormal mass mailing
hosts in network layer by mining the traffic in session layer.
Toolan et al. [28] investigated 40 features that have been used
in recent literature, and proposed behavioral features such as
number of words in sender field, total number of characters
in sender field, difference between sender’s domain and reply-
to domain, and difference between sender’s domains and the
email’s modal domain, to classify ham, spam, and phishing
emails. Ma et al. [24] attempted to identify phishing email
based on hybrid features. They derived 7 features categorized
into three classes, i.e. content features, orthographic features,
and derived features, and applied 5 machine learning algo-
rithms. Their results stated that Decision Trees worked best
in identifying phishing emails. Hamid et al. [12] proposed
a hybrid feature selection approach based on combination of
content and behaviour. Their approach mined attacker behavior
based on email header, and achieved an accuracy of 94% on
a publicly available test corpus.
All of the aforementioned work concentrates on distin-
guishing phishing emails from legitimate ones, using various
types of features extracted from email content, URLs, header
information etc. To the best of our knowledge, there exists little
work which focuses specifically on targeted spear phishing
emails. Further, there exists no work which utilizes features
from the social media profiles of the victim in order to
distinguish an attack email from a legitimate one. In this
work, we direct our focus on a very specific problem of
distinguishing targeted spear phishing emails from general
phishing, spam, and benign emails. Further, we apply social
features extracted from the LinkedIn profile of recipients of
such emails to judge whether an email is a spear phishing
email or not; which has never been attempted before, to the
best of our knowledge. We performed our entire analysis on
a real-world dataset derived from Symantec’s enterprise email
scanning service.
III. DATA COLLECTION METHODOLOGY
The dataset we used for the entire analysis, is a combina-
tion of two separate datasets, viz. a dataset of emails (com-
bination of targeted attack and non targeted attack emails),
and a dataset of LinkedIn profiles. We now explain both these
datasets in detail.
A. Email dataset
Our email dataset consisted of a combination of targeted
spear phishing emails, non targeted spam and phishing emails,
and benign emails. We obtained the targeted spear phishing
emails from Symantec’s enterprise email scanning service.
Symantec collects data regarding targeted attacks that consist of
emails with malicious attachments. These emails are identified
from the vast majority of non-targeted malware by evidence of
there being prior research and selection of the recipient, with
the malware being of high sophistication and low copy number.
The process by which Symantec’s enterprise mail scanning
service collects such malware has already been described
elsewhere [1], [23]. The corpus almost certainly omits some at-
tacks, and most likely also includes some non-targeted attacks,
but nevertheless it represents a large number of sophisticated
Spear phishing Attachment Name % Spam / phishing Attachment Name %
work.doc 3.46 100A 0.txt 20.74
More detail Chen Guangcheng.rar 3.01 100 5X AB PA1 MA-OCTET-STREAM form.html 9.02
ARMY 600 8 105.zip 2.54 ./attach/100 4X AZ-D PA2 FedEx=5FInvoice=5FN56=2D141.exe 4.19
Strategy Meeting.zip 1.58 100 2X PM3 EMS MA-OCTET=2DSTREAM apply.html 2.66
20120404 H 24 year annual business plan 1 quarterly.zip 1.33 100 4X AZ-D PA2 My=5Fsummer=5Fphotos=5Fin=5FEgypt=5F2011.exe 1.87
The extension of the measures against North Korea.zip 1.30 ./attach/100 2X PM2 EMS MA-OCTET=2DSTREAM ACC01291731.rtf 1.40
Strategy Meeting 120628.zip 1.28 100 5X AB PA1 MH NothernrockUpdate.html 1.28
image.scr 1.24 ./attach/100 2X PM2 EMS MA-OCTET=2DSTREAM invoice.rtf 1.15
Consolidation Schedule.doc 0.98 100 6X AZ-D PA4 US=2DCERT=20Operations=20Center=20Report=2DJan2012.exe 1.12
DARPA-BAA-11-65.zip 0.93 100 4X AZ-D PA2 I=27m=5Fwith=5Fmy=5Ffriends=5Fin=5FEgypt.exe 1.11
Head Office-Y drive.zip 0.93 100 4X AZ-D PA2 I=27m=5Fon=5Fthe=5FTurkish=5Fbeach=5F2012.exe 0.80
page 1-2.doc 0.90 100 5X AB PA1 MA-OCTET-STREAM Lloyds=R01TSB=R01-=R01Login=R01Form.html 0.69
Aircraft Procurement Plan.zip 0.90 100 6X AZ-D PA4 Fidelity=20Investments=20Review=2Dfrom=2DJan2012.exe 0.68
Overview of Health Reform.doc 0.74 100 4X AZ-D PA2 FedEx=5FInvoice=20=5FCopy=5FIDN12=2D374.exe 0.64
page 1-2.pdf 0.64 100 4X AZ-D PA2 my=5Fphoto=5Fin=5Fthe=5Fdominican=5Frepublic.exe 0.63
fisa.pdf 0.58 100 2X PM4 EMQ MH message.htm 0.60
urs.doc 0.52 /var/work0/attach/100 4X AZ-D PA2 document.exe 0.58
script.au3 0.50 100 6X AZ-D PA4 Information.exe 0.58
install reader10 en air gtbd aih.zip 0.48 /var/work0/attach/100 4X AZ-D PA2 Ticket.exe 0.57
dodi-3100-08.pdf 0.43 100 4X AZ-D PA2 Ticket.exe 0.57
TABLE I. TOP 20 MOST FREQUENTLY OCCURRING ATTACHMENT NAMES, AND THEIR CORRESPONDING PERCENTAGE SHARE IN OUR SPEAR PHISHING
AND SPAM / PHISHING DATASETS. ATTACHMENT NAMES IN THE SPEAR PHISHING EMAILS DATASET LOOK MUCH MORE REALISTIC AND GENUINE AS
COMPARED TO ATTACHMENT NAMES IN SPAM / PHISHING EMAILS DATASET.
targeted attacks compiled according to a consistent set of
criteria which render it a very useful dataset to study.
The non targeted attack emails were also obtained from
Symantec’s email scanning service. These emails were marked
as malicious, and were a combination of malware, spam, and
phishing. Both these datasets contained an enormously large
number of emails received at hundreds of organizations around
the world, where Symantec’s email scanning services are being
used. Before selecting a suitable sample for organization level
analysis, we present an overview of this entire data. Table I
shows the top 20 most frequently occurring attachment names
in the complete spear phishing and spam / phishing datasets.
We found distinct differences in the type of attachment names
in these two datasets. While names in spear phishing emails
looked fairly genuine and personalized, attachment names in
spam / phishing emails were irrelevant, and long. It was also
interesting to see that the attachment names associated with
spear phishing emails were less repetitive than those associated
with spam / phishing emails. As visible in Table I, the most
commonly occurring attachment name in spear phishing emails
was found in less than 3.5% of all spear phishing emails,
while in the case of spam / phishing emails, the most common
attachment name was present in over 20% of all spam /
phishing emails. This behavior reflects that attachments in
spear phishing emails are named more carefully, and with more
effort to make them look genuine.
We also looked at the most frequently spread file types in
spear phishing, spam, and phishing emails. Table II shows the
top 15 most frequently occurring file types in both the spear
phishing and spam / phishing email datasets. Not surprisingly,
both these datasets had notable presence of executable (.exe,
.bat, .com), and compressed (.rar, .zip, .7z) file types. In
fact, most of the file types spread through such emails were
among the most frequently used file types in general, too.
Microsoft Word, Excel, PowerPoint, and PDF files were also
amongst the most frequently spread files. It was, however,
interesting to note that lesser percentage of targeted spear
phishing emails contained executables than spam / phishing
emails. This reflects that attackers prepare targeted attacks
smartly as compared to spammers / phishers, and avoid using
executables, which are more prone to suspicion.
Spear phishing Attachment
Type
% Spam / phishing Attachment
Type
%
Zip archive data (zip) 19.59 Windows Executable (exe) 38.39
PDF document (pdf) 13.73 ASCII text (txt) 21.73
Composite Document File 13.63 Hypertext (html) 18.08
Windows Executable (exe) 11.20 Hypertext (htm) 7.06
Rich Text Format data (rtf) 10.40 Rich Text Format data (rtf) 3.04
RAR archive data (rar) 9.47 PDF document (pdf) 2.04
Screensaver (scr) 5.06 Zip archive data (zip) 1.75
data (dat) 3.00 Microsoft Word 1.27
JPEG image data (jpg) 1.64 Screensaver (scr) 1.14
CLASS 1.56 Microsoft Excel (xls) 0.81
Microsoft Word 2007+ 1.15 Program Info. file (pif) 0.80
7-zip archive data (7z) 1.12 Dynamic-link Library (dll) 0.30
Shortcut (lnk) 1.08 Windows Batch file (.bat) 0.24
ASCII text (txt) 0.80 JavaScript (js) 0.17
Dynamic-link Library (dll) 0.54 Microsoft HTML Help (chm) 0.16
TABLE II. TOP 15 MOST FREQUENTLY OCCURRING ATTACHMENT
TYPES, AND THEIR CORRESPONDING PERCENTAGE SHARE IN OUR SPEAR
PHISHING AND SPAM / PHISHING DATASETS. ONLY 5 FILE TYPES WERE
COMMON IN THE TOP 15 IN THESE DATASETS.
All the emails present in our full dataset were collected
over a period of slightly under 4 years, from March 2009 to
December 2013. Figure 2 presents a timeline of the “received
time” of all these emails. The spam / phishing emails were
collected over a period of 3 years, from March 2009 to March
2012. The targeted spear phishing emails were also collected
during a period of about 3 years, but from January 2011,
to December 2013. The two datasets, thus, had data for a
common time period of about 15 months, from January 2011,
to March 2012. It was interesting to observe that during this
period, while the number of spam and phishing emails saw a
tremendous rise, the number of spear phishing emails did not
vary too much. This characteristic was observed for the entire
3-year period for spear phishing emails. The number of spear
phishing emails received in the beginning and end of our three
year observation period saw a 238% rise, as compared to a rise
of 35,422% percent in the number of spam / phishing emails.
In addition to the attachment information and timeline, we
also looked at the “subject” fields of all the emails present
1"
10"
100"
1000"
10000"
100000"
1000000"
10000000"
M
ar
'0
9"
M
ay
'0
9"
Ju
l'0
9"
Se
p'
09
"
N
ov
'0
9"
Ja
n'
10
"
M
ar
'1
0"
M
ay
'1
0"
Ju
l'1
0"
Se
p'
10
"
N
ov
'1
0"
Ja
n'
11
"
M
ar
'1
1"
M
ay
'1
1"
Ju
l'1
1"
Se
p'
11
"
N
ov
'1
1"
Ja
n'
12
"
M
ar
'1
2"
M
ay
'1
2"
Ju
l'1
2"
Se
p'
12
"
N
ov
'1
2"
Ja
n'
13
"
M
ar
'1
3"
M
ay
'1
3"
Ju
l'1
3"
Se
p'
13
"
N
ov
'1
3"
N
um
be
r'o
f'e
m
ai
ls
'
Number"of"spam"/"phishing"emails"
Number"of"spear"phishing"emails"
Fig. 2. Timeline of the number of spear phishing and spam / phishing emails in our dataset. The X axis represents time, and the Y axis represents the number
of emails on a logarithmic scale. The period of May 2011 - September 2011 saw an exponential increase in the number of spam / phishing emails in our dataset.
in our datasets. Table III shows the top 20 most frequently
occurring “subject lines” in our datasets. Evidently, “subjects”
in both these datasets were very different in terms of con-
text. Targeted spear phishing email subjects seemed to be
very professional, talking about jobs, meetings, unclassified
information etc. Spam / phishing email subjects, however,
were observed to follow a completely different genre. These
emails’ subjects were found to follow varied themes, out of
which, three broad themes were fairly prominent: a) fake
email delivery failure error messages, which lure victims into
opening these emails to see which of their emails failed, and
why; b) arrival of packages or couriers by famous courier
delivery services – victims tend to open such messages out
of curiosity, even if they are not expecting a package; and
c) personalized messages via third party websites and social
networks (Hallmark E-Card, hi5 friend request, and Facebook
message in this case). Most of such spam / phishing emails
have generic subjects, to which most victims can relate easily,
as compared to spear phishing email subjects, which would
seem irrelevant to most common users.
It is important to note that these statistics are for the
complete datasets we obtained from Symantec. The total
number of emails present in the complete dataset was of the
order of hundred thousands. However, we performed our entire
analysis on a sample picked from this dataset. The analysis in
the rest of the paper talks about only this sample. To make
our analysis more exhaustive, we also used a sample of benign
emails from the Enron email dataset for our analysis [6]. All
the three email datasets had duplicates, which we identified
and removed by using a combination of 5 fields, viz. from ID,
to ID, subject, body, and timestamp. On further investigation,
we found that these duplicate email messages were different
instances of the same email. This happens when an email is
sent to multiple recipients at the same time. A globally unique
message-id is generated for each recipient, and thus results in
duplication of the message. Elimination of duplicates reduced
our email sample dataset by about 50%. Our final sample
email dataset that we used for all our analysis was, therefore,
a mixture of targeted attack emails, non targeted attack emails,
and benign emails. We now describe this sample.
B. Email Sample Dataset Description
To focus our analysis at the organization level, we identified
and extracted the most attacked organizations (excluding free
email providing services like Gmail, Yahoo, Hotmail etc.)
from the domain names of the victims’ email addresses, and
picked 14 most frequently attacked organizations. We were
however, restricted to pick only those organizations, where the
first names and last names were easily extractable from the
email addresses. The first name and last name were required
to obtain the corresponding LinkedIn profiles of these victims
(this process is discussed in detail in Section III-C). This
restriction, in addition to removal of duplicates, left us with
a total of 4,742 targeted spear phishing emails sent to 2,434
unique victims (referred to as SPEAR in the rest of the paper);
9,353 non targeted attack emails sent to 5,912 unique non
victims (referred to as SPAM in the rest of the paper), and
6,601 benign emails from the Enron dataset, sent to 1,240
unique Enron employees (referred to as BENIGN in the rest
of the paper). Further details of this dataset can be found
in Table IV. Table contains the number of victims, and non
victims in each of the 15 companies (including Enron), and
the number of emails sent to them. The victim and non victim
employee sets are mutually exhaustive, and each employee in
these datasets received at least one email, and had at least one
LinkedIn profile. To maintain anonymity, we do not include
the name of the organizations we picked; we only mention the
operation sector of these companies.
Figures 3(a), 3(c), and 3(d) represent the tag clouds of the
100 most frequently occurring words in the “subject” fields
of our SPEAR, SPAM, and BENIGN datasets respectively.
We noticed considerable differences between subjects from
all the three datasets. While all three datasets were observed
to have a lot of forwarded emails (represented by “fw”, and
“fwd” in the tag clouds), SPAM and BENIGN datasets were
found to have much more reply emails (signified by “re”
in the tag clouds) as compared to SPEAR emails. These
characteristics of whether an email is forwarded, or a reply,
have previously been used as boolean features by researchers
to distinguish between phishing and benign emails [28]. The
difference in vocabularies used across the three email datasets
Spear phishing subjects % Spam / phishing subjects %
Job Opportunity 3.45 Mail delivery failed: returning message to sender 10.95
Strategy Meeting 3.09 Delivery Status Notification (Failure) 6.71
What is Chen Guangcheng fighting for? 3.00 Re: 2.59
FW: [2] for the extension of the measures against North Korea 1.70 Re 2.56
[UNCLASSIFIED] 2012 U.S.Army orders for weapons 1.27 Become A Paid Mystery Shopper Today! Join and Shop For Free! 1.28
FW:[UNCLASSIFIED]2012 U.S.Army orders for weapons 1.27 failure notice 1.09
<blank subject line> 1.17 Delivery Status Notification (Delay) 1.06
FW: results of homemaking 2007 annual business plan (min quarter 1 included) 1.02 Returned mail: see transcript for details 0.95
[UNCLASSIFIED]DSO-DARPA-BAA-11-65 0.93 Get a job as Paid Mystery Shopper! Shop for free and get Paid! 0.85
Wage Data 2012 0.90 Application number: AA700003125331 0.82
U.S.Air Force Procurement Plan 2012 0.90 Your package is available for pickup 0.78
About seconded expatriate management in overseas offices 0.80 Your statement is ready for your review 0.75
FW:[CLASSIFIED] 2012 USA Government of the the Health Reform 0.74 Unpaid invoice 2913. 0.71
T.T COPY 0.62 Track your parcel 0.70
USA to Provide Declassified FISA Documents 0.58 You have received A Hallmark E-Card! 0.59
FY2011-12 Annual Merit Compensation Guidelines for Staff 0.55 Your Account Opening is completed. 0.57
Contact List Update 0.45 Delivery failure 0.57
DOD Technical Cooperation Program 0.43 Undelivered Mail Returned to Sender 0.56
DoD Protection of Whistleblowing Spies 0.43 Laura would like to be your friend on hi5! 0.56
FW:UK Non Paper on arrangements for the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) Secretariat 0.42 You have got a new message on Facebook! 0.55
TABLE III. TOP 20 MOST FREQUENTLY OCCURRING SUBJECTS, AND THEIR CORRESPONDING PERCENTAGE SHARE IN OUR SPEAR PHISHING, AND SPAM
/ PHISHING EMAIL DATASETS. SPEAR PHISHING EMAIL SUBJECTS APPEAR TO DEPICT THAT THESE EMAILS CONTAIN HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL DATA. SPAM /
PHISHING EMAILS, ON THE OTHER HAND, ARE MAINLY THEMED AROUND EMAIL DELIVERY ERROR MESSAGES, AND COURIER OR PACKAGE RECEIPTS.
Sector #Victims #Emails #Non
Victims
#Emails No. of Em-
ployees
Govt. & Diplomatic 206 511 572 1,103 10,001+
Info. & Broadcasting 150 326 240 418 10,001+
NGO 131 502 218 472 1001-5000
IT/Telecom/Defense 158 406 68 157 1001-5000
Pharmaceuticals 120 216 589 862 10,001+
Engineering 396 553 1000 1,625 10,001+
Automotive 153 601 891 1,204 10,001+
Aviation/Aerospace 281 355 161 187 1001-5000
Agriculture 94 138 173 264 10,001+
IT & Telecom 11 12 543 943 5001-10,000
Defense 388 651 123 147 10,001+
Oil & energy 201 212 680 1,017 10,001+
Finance 89 129 408 608 10,001+
Chemicals 56 130 248 346 10,001+
Enron NA NA 1,240 6,601 10,001+
Total 2,434 4,742 7,154 15,954
TABLE IV. DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF OUR DATASET OF LINKEDIN
PROFILES AND EMAILS ACROSS 15 ORGANIZATIONS INCLUDING ENRON.
is also notable. The SPEAR dataset (Figure 3(a)) was found to
be full of attention-grabbing words like strategy, unclassified,
warning, weapons, defense, US Army etc. Artifact V shows an
example of the attachment name, subject and body of such an
email. We removed the received address and other details to
maintain anonymity.
SPAM emails in our dataset (Figure 3(c)) followed a
completely different genre, dominated by words like parcel,
order, delivery, tracking, notification, shipment etc. We also
found mentions of famous courier service brand names like
FedEx and DHL which seem to have been used for targeting
victims. Such attacks have been widely talked about in the
recent past; users have also been warned about scams, and
infected payloads (like spyware or malware), that accompany
such emails. 6 7 Some examples of attachment names, and
subjects of such non targeted SPAM emails are shown in
Artifact VI. BENIGN subjects comprised of diverse keywords
like report, program, meeting, migration, energy, which did
not seem specific to a particular theme (Figure 3(d)). These
keywords were fairly representative of the kind of typical
internal communication that may have been going on in the
company.
6http://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2013/03/20/dhl-delivery-malware/
7http://www.spamfighter.com/News-13360-FedEx-and-DHL-Spam-
Attack-with-Greater-Ferocity.htm
We also compared the body content of SPEAR and BE-
NIGN emails. Figures 3(b) and 3(e) represent the tag clouds
of the 100 most frequently occurring words in the body fields
of the SPEAR and BENIGN datasets respectively. Contrary
to our observations from the subject content in the SPEAR
dataset (Figure 3(a)), the body content of the SPEAR emails
(Figure 3(b)) did not look very attention-grabbing or themed.
SPEAR bodies contained words like attached, please, email,
dear, materials, phone etc., which commonly occur in routine
email communications too. The BENIGN body content did
not contain anything peculiar or alarming either (Figure 3(e)).
Since Symantec’s email dataset of spear phishing, spam and
phishing emails isn’t publicly available, we believe that this
characterization of our dataset can be useful for researchers to
get a better idea of state-of-the-art, real world malicious email
data which circulates in the corporate environment.
C. LinkedIn profile dataset
Our second dataset consisted of LinkedIn profiles of the
receivers of all the emails present in our email dataset. In fact,
we restricted our email dataset to only those emails which
were sent to employees having at least one LinkedIn profile.
This was done to have a complete dataset in terms of the
availability of social and stylometric features. There were two
major challenges with data collection from LinkedIn; a) Strict
input requirements, and b) Rate limited API.
Firstly, to fetch the profiles of LinkedIn users who are
outside a user’s network (3rd degree connections and beyond),
the LinkedIn People Search API requires first name, last name,
and company name as a mandatory input. 8 Understandably,
none of the users we were looking for, were in our network,
and thus, as specified in the previous subsection, we were
restricted to pick up emails of only those companies which
followed the format firstName.lastName@companyDomain or
firstName lastName@companyDomain. Restricting our dataset
to such email addresses was the only way we could satisfy the
API’s input requirements.
Secondly, the rate limit of the people search API posed a
major hindrance. Towards the end of 2013, LinkedIn imposed
8developer.linkedin.com/documents/people-search-api
(a) SPEAR subjects (b) SPEAR bodies (c) SPAM subjects
(d) BENIGN subjects (e) BENIGN bodies
Fig. 3. Tag clouds of the 100 most frequently occurring words in the subjects and bodies of our SPEAR, SPAM, and BENIGN datasets. Bodies of SPAM
emails were not available in our dataset.
a tight limit of 250 calls per day, per application, on the people
search API for existing developers, and completely restricted
access for new applications and developers, under their Vetted
API access program. 9 We were able to get access to the
Vetted API for two of our applications. Although the new
rate limit allowed 100,000 API calls per day, per application,
this was still restricted to 100 calls per user, per day, per
application. We then created multiple LinkedIn user accounts
to make calls to the API. Even with multiple applications,
and user accounts, this data collection process took about 4
months. This happened because a lot of our search queries to
the API returned no results. On average, we were able to find
a LinkedIn profile for only 1 in 10 users in our dataset. This
resulted in about 90% of the API calls returning no results,
and hence getting wasted. Eventually, we were able to collect
a total of 2,434 LinkedIn profiles of victims, 5,914 LinkedIn
profiles of non victims, across the 14 organizations; and 1,240
LinkedIn profiles of employees from Enron (Table IV). To
obtain these profiles for the 9,588 employees (2,434 victims,
5,914 non victims, and 1,240 Enron employees), the number of
API calls we had to make was approximately 100,000 (approx.
10 times the number of profiles obtained). Figure 4 shows the
flow diagram describing our data collection process.
Our first choices for extracting social features about em-
ployees were Facebook, and Twitter. However, we found that
identifying an individual on Facebook and Twitter using only
the first name, last name, and employer company was a hard
task. Unlike LinkedIn, the Facebook and Twitter APIs do not
provide endpoints to search people using the work company
name. This left us with the option to search for people using
first name, and last name only. However, searching for people
using only these two fields returned too many results on
9https://developer.linkedin.com/blog/vetted-api-access
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Fig. 4. Flow diagram describing the data collection process we used to
collect LinkedIn data, and create our final feature vector containing stylometric
features from emails, and social features from LinkedIn profiles.
both Facebook and Twitter, and we had no way to identify
the correct user that we were looking for. We then visited
the profile pages of some users returned by the API results
manually, and discovered that the work field for most users on
Facebook was private. On Twitter profiles, there did not exist
a work field at all. It thus became very hard to be able to find
Facebook or Twitter profiles using the email addresses in our
dataset.
IV. ANALYSIS AND RESULTS
To distinguish spear phishing emails from non spear phish-
ing emails using social features of the receivers, we used
four machine learning algorithms, and a total of 27 features;
18 stylometric, and 9 social. The entire analysis and classi-
fication tasks were performed using the Weka data mining
software [11]. We applied 10-fold cross validation to validate
our classification results. We now describe our feature sets,
analysis, and results of the classification.
Attachment: All information about mobile phone.rar
Subject: RE: Issues with Phone for help
Body: <name>,
Thanks for your replying.I contacted my supplier,but he could not resolved it.Now I
was worried, so I take the liberty of writing to you.I collect all information including
sim card details,number,order record and letters in the txt file.I hope you can deal
with the issues as your promised.
Best,
<name>
—–Original Message—–
From: Customer Care [mailto:Customer Care@<companyDomain>]
Sent: 2011-12-8 0:35
To: <name>
Cc:
Subject: RE: Issues with Phone for help
Dear <name>,
Thank you for your E-mail. I am sorry to hear of your issues. Please can you send
your SIM card details or Mobile number so that we can identify your supplier who
can assist you further?
Thank you
Kind regards,
<name>
Customer Service Executive
<Company Name>,
<Company Address>
United Kingdom
Tel: <telephone number>
Fax : <Fax number>
<company website>
—–Original Message—–
From: <name> [mailto:<email address>]
Sent: 08 December 2011 08:27
To: support@<companyDomain>
Subject: Issues with Phone for help
Hello,
I purchased order for your IsatPhone Pro six months ago.Now I have trouble
that it can’t work normally.It often automatic shuts down.Sometimes it tells some
information that i can’t understand.How to do?Can you help me?
Best,
<name>
This e-mail has been scanned for viruses by Verizon Business Internet Man-
aged Scanning Services - powered by MessageLabs. For further information visit
http://www.verizonbusiness.com/uk
ARTIFACT V. A SPEAR PHISHING EMAIL FROM OUR SPEAR
DATASET. THE EMAIL SHOWS A SEEMINGLY GENUINE CONVERSATION,
WHERE THE ATTACKER SENT A MALICIOUS COMPRESSED (.RAR)
ATTACHMENT TO THE VICTIM IN THE MIDDLE OF THE CONVERSATION.
Attachment: 100A 0.txt
Subject: DHL Express Notification for shipment 15238305825550113
Attachment: ./attach/100 4X AZ-D PA2 FedEx=5FInvoice=5FN 56=2D141.exe
Subject: FEDEX Shipment Status NR-6804
ARTIFACT VI. EXAMPLES OF subject AND attachment NAMES OF TWO
SPAM EMAILS FROM OUR SPAM DATASET. THE body FIELD OF THE
EMAILS WAS NOT AVAILABLE IN THIS DATASET.
A. Feature set description
We extracted a set of 18 stylometric features from each
email in our email dataset, and a set of 9 social features from
each LinkedIn profile present in our LinkedIn profile dataset,
features described in Table VII. Features extracted from our
email dataset are further categorized into three categories,
viz. subject features, attachment features, and body features.
It is important to note that we did not have all the three
types of these aforementioned features available for all our
datasets. While the SPAM dataset did not have body features,
the BENIGN dataset did not have the attachment features.
Features marked with ∗ (in Table VII) have been previously
used by researchers to classify spam and phishing emails [28].
The richness feature is calculated as the ratio of the number
of words to the number of characters present in the text
content under consideration. We calculate richness value for
the email subject, email body, and LinkedIn profile summary.
The Body hasAttach features is a boolean variable which is set
to true, if the body of the email contain the word “attached”
or “attachment”, indicating that an attachment is enclosed
with the email. This feature helped us to capture the pres-
ence of attachments for the BENIGN dataset, which did not
have attachment information. The Body numFunctionWords
feature captures the total number of occurrences of function
words present in the email body, from a list of function
words which includes the words: account, access, bank,
credit, click, identity, inconvenience, information, limited, log,
minutes, password, recently, risk, social, security, service,
and suspended. These features have been previously used by
Chandrasekaran [4].
Feature Data Type Source
Subject IsReply∗ Boolean Email
Subject hasBank∗ Boolean Email
Subject numWords∗ Numeric Email
Subject numChars∗ Numeric Email
Subject richness∗ Decimal (0-1) Email
Subject isForwarded∗ Boolean Email
Subject hasVerify∗ Boolean Email
Length of attachment name Numeric Email
Attachment size (bytes) Numeric Email
Body numUniqueWords∗ Numeric Email
Body numNewlines Numeric Email
Body numWords∗ Numeric Email
Body numChars∗ Numeric Email
Body richness∗ Decimal (0-1) Email
Body hasAttach Boolean Email
Body numFunctionWords∗ Numeric Email
Body verifyYourAccount∗ Boolean Email
Body hasSuspension∗ Boolean Email
Location Text (country) LinkedIn
numConnections Numeric (0-500) LinkedIn
SummaryLength Numeric LinkedIn
SummaryNumChars Numeric LinkedIn
SummaryUniqueWords Numeric LinkedIn
SummaryNumWords Numeric LinkedIn
SummaryRichness Decimal (0-1) LinkedIn
jobLevel Numeric (0-7) LinkedIn
jobType Numeric (0-9) LinkedIn
TABLE VII. LIST OF FEATURES USED IN OUR ANALYSIS. WE USED A
COMBINATION OF STYLOMETRIC FEATURES IN ADDITION TO NORMAL
FEATURES. FEATURES MARKED WITH ∗ HAVE BEEN PREVIOUSLY USED
FOR DETECTING SPAM AND PHISHING EMAILS.
The social features we extracted from the LinkedIn profiles,
captured three distinct types of information about an employee,
viz. location, connectivity, and profession. The Location was
a text field containing the state / country level location of
an employee, as specified by her on her LinkedIn profile.
We extracted and used the country for our analysis. The
numConnections was a numeric field, and captured the number
of connections that a user has on LinkedIn. If the number of
connections for a user is more than 500, the value returned
is “500+” instead of the actual number of connections. These
features captured the location and connectivity respectively.
In addition to these two, we extracted 5 features from the
Summary field, and 2 features from the headline field returned
by LinkedIn’s People Search API. The Summary field is a
long, free-text field comprising of a summary about a user,
as specified by her, and is optional. The features we extracted
from this field were similar to the ones we extracted from the
subject and body fields in our email dataset. These features
were, the summary length, number of characters, number
of unique words, total number of words, and richness. We
introduced two new features, job level and job type, which are
numeric values ranging from 0 to 7, and 0 to 9 respectively,
describing the position and area of work of an individual. We
looked for presence of certain level and designation specific
keywords in the “headline” field of a user, as returned by the
LinkedIn API. The job levels and job types, and their numeric
equivalents are as follows:
• Job level; maximum of the following:
1 - Support
2 - Intern
3 - Temporary
4 - IC
5 - Manager
6 - Director
7 - Executive
0 - Other; if none of the above are found.
• Job type; minimum of the following:
1 - Engineering
2 - Research
3 - QA
4 - Information Technology
5 - Operations
6 - Human Resources
7 - Legal
8 - Finance
9 - Sales / Marketing
0 - Other; if none of the above are found.
To see if information extracted about a victim from online
social media helps in identifying a spear phishing email sent to
her, we performed classification using a) email features 10; b)
social features, and c) using a combination of these features.
We compared these three accuracy scores across a combination
of datasets viz. SPEAR versus SPAM emails from Symantec’s
email scanning service, SPEAR versus benign emails from
BENIGN dataset, and SPEAR versus a mixture of emails from
BENIGN, and SPAM from the Symantec dataset. As men-
tioned earlier, not all email features mentioned in Table VII
were available for all the three email datasets. The BENIGN
dataset did not have attachment related features, and the body
field was missing in the SPAM email dataset. We thus used
only those features for classification, which were available in
both the targeted, and non targeted emails.
B. SPEAR versus SPAM emails from Symantec
Table VIII presents the results of our first analysis where
we subjected SPEAR and SPAM emails from Symantec, to
four machine learning classification algorithms, viz. Random
Forest [3], J48 Decision Tree [26], Naive Bayesian [17], and
10We further split email features into subject, body, and attachment features
for analysis, wherever available.
Decision Table [18]. Feature vectors for this analysis were
prepared from 4,742 SPEAR emails, and 9,353 SPAM emails,
combined with social features extracted from the LinkedIn
profiles of receivers of these emails. Using a combination
of all email and social features, we were able to achieve
a maximum accuracy of 96.47% using the Random Forest
classifier for classifying SPEAR and SPAM emails. However,
it was interesting to notice that two out of the four classifiers
performed better without the social features. Although the
Decision Table classifier seemed to perform equally well with,
and without the social features, it performed much better using
only email features, as compared to only social features. 11
In fact, the Decision Table classifier achieved the maximum
accuracy using attachment features, which highlights that the
attachments associated with SPEAR and SPAM emails were
also substantially different in terms of name and size. We
achieved an overall maximum accuracy of 98.28% using the
Random Forest classifier trained on only email features. This
behavior revealed that the public information available on the
LinkedIn profile of an employee in our dataset, does not help in
determining whether she will be targeted for a spear phishing
attack or not.
Feature set Classifier Random
Forest
J48 Deci-
sion Tree
Naive
Bayesian
Decision
Table
Subject (7) Accuracy (%) 83.91 83.10 58.87 82.04
FP rate 0.208 0.227 0.371 0.227
Attachment (2) Accuracy (%) 97.86 96.69 69.15 95.05
FP rate 0.035 0.046 0.218 0.056
All email (9) Accuracy (%) 98.28 97.32 68.69 95.05
FP rate 0.024 0.035 0.221 0.056
Social (9) Accuracy (%) 81.73 76.63 65.85 70.90
FP rate 0.229 0.356 0.445 0.41
Email + Accuracy (%) 96.47 95.90 69.35 95.05
Social (18) FP rate 0.052 0.054 0.232 0.056
TABLE VIII. ACCURACY AND WEIGHED FALSE POSITIVE RATES FOR
SPEAR VERSUS SPAM EMAILS. SOCIAL FEATURES REDUCE THE
ACCURACY WHEN COMBINED WITH EMAIL FEATURES.
To get a better understanding of the results, we looked
at the information gain associated with each feature using
the InfoGainAttributeEval Attribute Evaluator package. 12 This
package calculates the information gain 13 associated with
each feature, and ranks the features in descending order of the
information gain value. The ranking revealed that the attach-
ment related features were the most distinguishing features
between SPEAR and SPAM emails. This phenomenon was
also highlighted by the Decision Table classifier (Table VIII).
The attachment size was the most distinguishing feature with
an information gain score of 0.631, followed by length of
attachment name, with an information gain score of 0.485. As
evident from Table IX, attachment sizes associated with SPAM
emails have very high standard deviation values, even though
the average attachment sizes of SPAM and SPEAR emails are
fairly similar. It is also evident that attachments associated with
SPAM emails tend to have longer names; on average, twice
in size as compared to attachments associated with SPEAR
emails. Among subject features, we found no major difference
11This happened because the Decision Table classifier terminates search
after scanning for a certain (fixed) number of non-improving nodes / features.
12http://weka.sourceforge.net/doc.dev/weka/attributeSelection/
InfoGainAttributeEval.html
13This value ranges between 0 and 1, where a higher value represents a
more discriminating feature.
in the length (number of characters, and number of words) of
the subject fields across the two email datasets.
Feature Info. Gain SPEAR SPAMMean Std Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Attachment size (Kb) 0.6312 285 531 262 1,419
Len. attachment name 0.4859 25.48 16.03 51.08 23.29
Subject richness 0.2787 0.159 0.05 0.177 0.099
Subject numChars 0.1650 29.61 17.77 31.82 23.85
Location 0.0728 - - - -
Subject numWords 0.0645 4.74 3.28 4.59 3.97
numConnections 0.0219 158.68 164.31 183.82 171.45
Subject isForwarded 0.0219 - - - -
Subject isReply 0.0154 - - - -
SummaryRichness 0.0060 0.045 0.074 0.053 0.078
TABLE IX. INFORMATION GAIN, MEAN AND STANDARD DEVIATION
OF THE 10 MOST INFORMATIVE FEATURES FROM SPEAR AND SPAM
EMAILS.
It was interesting to see that apart from the Location,
number of LinkedIn connections, and SummaryRichness, none
of the other social features were ranked amongst the top 10
informative features. Figure 5 shows the top 25 Locations
extracted from the LinkedIn profiles of employees of the 14
companies who received SPAM and SPEAR emails. We found
a fairly high correlation of 0.88 between the number of SPAM
and SPEAR emails received at these locations, depicting that
there is not much difference between the number of SPAM
and SPEAR emails received by most locations. This falls in
line with the low information gain associated with this feature.
Among the top 25, only 3 locations viz. France, Australia, and
Afghanistan received more SPEAR emails than SPAM emails.
Fig. 5. Number of SPEAR and SPAM emails received by employees in the
top 25 locations extracted from their LinkedIn profiles. Employees working in
France, Australia, and Afghanistan received more SPEAR emails than SPAM
emails.
The number of LinkedIn connections of the recipients of
SPEAR and SPAM emails in our dataset are presented in
Figure 6. There wasn’t much difference between the number
of LinkedIn connections of recipients of SPEAR emails, and
the number of LinkedIn connections of recipients of SPAM
emails. We grouped the number of LinkedIn connections into
11 buckets as represented by the X axis in Figure 6, and
found a strong correlation value of 0.97 across the two classes
(SPEAR and SPAM). This confirmed that the number of
LinkedIn connections did not vary much between recipients
of SPEAR and SPAM emails, and thus, is not an informative
feature for distinguishing between SPEAR and SPAM emails.
Fig. 6. Number of LinkedIn connections of the recipients of SPEAR and
SPAM emails. The number of connections are plotted on the X axis, and the
number of employee profiles are plotted on the Y axis. Maximum number of
employee profiles had less than 50 LinkedIn connections.
C. SPEAR emails versus BENIGN emails
Similar to the analysis performed in Section IV-B, we
applied machine learning algorithms on a different dataset
containing SPEAR emails, and BENIGN emails. This dataset
contained 4,742 SPEAR emails, and 6,601 benign emails
from BENIGN. Since BENIGN mostly contains internal email
communication between Enron’s employees, we believe that it
is safe to assume that none of these emails would be targeted
spear phishing emails, and can be marked as benign. Similar
to our observations in Section IV-B, we found that, in this
case too, only email features performed slightly better than
a combination of email and social features, at distinguishing
spear phishing emails from non spear phishing emails. We
were able to achieve a maximum accuracy of 97.04% using
the Random Forest classifier trained on a set of 25 features; 16
email, and 9 social features. However, the overall maximum
accuracy that we were able to achieve for this dataset was
97.39%, using only email features. Table X shows the results
of our analysis in detail. Three out of the four classifiers
performed best with email features; two classifiers performed
best using a combination of subject and body features, while
one classifier performed best using only body features. The
Naive Bayes classifier worked best using social features.
Feature set Classifier Random
Forest
J48 Deci-
sion Tree
Naive
Bayesian
Decision
Table
Subject (7) Accuracy (%) 81.19 81.11 61.75 79.55
FP rate 0.210 0.217 0.489 0.228
Body (9) Accuracy (%) 97.17 95.62 53.81 90.85
FP rate 0.031 0.048 0.338 0.082
All email (16) Accuracy (%) 97.39 95.84 54.14 89.80
FP rate 0.029 0.044 0.334 0.090
Social (9) Accuracy (%) 94.48 91.79 69.76 83.80
FP rate 0.067 0.103 0.278 0.198
Email + Accuracy (%) 97.04 95.28 57.27 89.80
Social (25) FP rate 0.032 0.052 0.316 0.090
TABLE X. ACCURACY AND WEIGHED FALSE POSITIVE RATES FOR
SPEAR EMAILS VERSUS BENIGN EMAILS. SIMILAR TO SPEAR VERSUS
SPAM, SOCIAL FEATURES DECREASE THE ACCURACY WHEN COMBINED
WITH EMAIL FEATURES IN THIS CASE TOO.
Table XI presents the 10 most informative features, along
with their information gain, mean and standard deviation
values from the SPEAR and BENIGN datasets. The body
features were found to be the most informative in this analysis,
with only 2 social features among the top 10. Emails in
the BENIGN dataset were found to be much longer than
SPEAR emails in our Symantec dataset in terms of number of
words, and number of characters in their “body”. The “subject”
lengths, however, were found to be very similar across SPEAR
and BENIGN.
Feature Info. SPEAR BENIGNGain Mean Std Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Body richness 0.6506 0.134 0.085 0.185 0.027
Body numChars 0.5816 313.60 650.48 1735.5 8692.6
Body numWords 0.4954 53.12 107.53 312.81 1572.1
Body numUniqueWords 0.4766 38.08 49.70 149.93 416.40
Location 0.3013 - - - -
Body numNewlines 0.2660 11.29 32.70 43.58 215.77
Subject richness 0.2230 0.159 0.051 0.174 0.056
numConnections 0.1537 158.68 164.31 259.89 167.14
Subj numChars 0.1286 29.61 17.77 28.54 15.23
Body numFunctionWords 0.0673 0.375 1.034 1.536 5.773
TABLE XI. INFORMATION GAIN, MEAN AND STANDARD DEVIATION
OF THE 10 MOST INFORMATIVE FEATURES FROM SPEAR AND BENIGN
EMAILS. THE body FEATURES PERFORMED BEST AT DISTINGUISHING
SPEAR EMAILS FROM BENIGN EMAILS.
The Random Forest classifier was also able to achieve an
accuracy rate of 94.48% using only social features; signifying
that there exist distinct differences between the LinkedIn
profiles of Enron employees, and the LinkedIn profiles of the
employees of the 14 companies in our dataset. The location
attribute was found to be the most distinguishing feature
among the social features. This was understandable since most
of the Enron employees were found to be based in the US
(as Enron was an American services company). However, we
also found a considerable difference in the average number
of LinkedIn connections of Enron employees, and employees
of the 14 organizations from our dataset (mean values for
numConnections feature in Table XI).
D. SPEAR versus a mixture of BENIGN and SPAM
While analyzing SPEAR with SPAM, and BENIGN emails
separately, we found similar results where social features were
not found to be very useful in both the cases. So we decided to
use a mixture of SPAM and BENIGN emails against SPEAR
emails, and perform the classification tasks again. We found
that in this case, two out of the four classifiers performed
better with a combination of email and social features, while
two classifiers performed better with only email features.
However, the overall maximum accuracy was achieved using
a combination of email and social features (89.86% using
Random Forest classifier). This result is in contradiction with
our analysis of SPEAR versus SPAM, and SPEAR versus
BENIGN separately, where email features always performed
better independently, than a combination of email and social
features. Our overall maximum accuracy, however, dropped
to 89.86% (from 98.28% in SPEAR versus SPAM email
classification) because of the absence of attachment features in
this dataset. Although the attachment features were available
in the SPAM dataset, their unavailability in BENIGN forced
us to remove this feature for the current classification task.
Eventually, merging the SPAM email dataset with BENIGN
reduced our email dataset to only 7 features, all based on the
email “subject”. Table XII presents the detailed results from
this analysis.
Feature set Classifier Random
Forest
J48 Deci-
sion Tree
Naive
Bayesian
Decision
Table
Subject (7) Accuracy (%) 86.48 86.35 77.99 85.46
FP rate 0.333 0.352 0.681 0.341
Social (9) Accuracy (%) 88.04 84.69 74.46 80.61
FP rate 0.241 0.371 0.454 0.432
Email + Accuracy (%) 89.86 88.38 73.97 84.14
Social (16) FP rate 0.202 0.248 0.381 0.250
TABLE XII. ACCURACY AND WEIGHED FALSE POSITIVE RATES FOR
SPEAR EMAILS VERSUS MIX OF SPAM EMAILS AND BENIGN EMAILS.
UNLIKE SPEAR VERSUS SPAM, OR SPEAR VERSUS BENIGN, social
FEATURES INCREASED THE ACCURACY WHEN COMBINED WITH EMAIL
FEATURES IN THIS CASE.
As mentioned earlier, combining the SPAM email dataset
with BENIGN largely reduced our email feature set. We were
left with 7 out of a total of 18 email features described in
Table VII. Understandably, due to this depleted email feature
set, we found that the email features did not perform as good
as social features in this classification task. Despite being
fewer in number, the subject features, viz. Subject richness
and Subject numChars were found to be two of the most in-
formative features (Table XIII). However, the information gain
value associated with both these features was fairly low. This
shows that even being the best features, the Subject richness
and Subject numChars were not highly distinctive features
amongst spear phishing, and non spear phishing emails. Simi-
lar mean and standard deviation values for both these features
in Table XIII confirm these outcomes.
Feature Info. Gain SPEAR SPAM + BENIGNMean Std Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Subject richness 0.1829 0.159 0.051 0.176 0.084
Subject numChars 0.1050 29.61 17.77 30.46 20.79
Location 0.0933 - - - -
numConnections 0.0388 158.68 164.31 215.30 173.76
Subject numWords 0.0311 4.74 3.28 4.75 3.57
Subject isForwarded 0.0188 - - - -
Subject isReply 0.0116 - - - -
SummaryNumChars 0.0108 140.98 308.17 198.62 367.81
SummaryRichness 0.0090 0.045 0.074 0.057 0.080
jobLevel 0.0088 3.41 2.40 3.71 2.49
TABLE XIII. INFORMATION GAIN, MEAN AND STANDARD DEVIATION
OF THE 10 MOST INFORMATIVE FEATURES FROM SPEAR AND A
COMBINATION OF BENIGN AND SPAM EMAILS. THE subject FEATURES
PERFORMED BEST AT DISTINGUISHING SPEAR EMAILS FROM NON
SPEAR EMAILS.
Contrary to our observations in SPEAR versus SPAM, and
SPEAR versus BENIGN emails, we found five social features
among the top 10 features in this analysis. These were the
Location, numConnections, SummaryNumChars, Richness, and
jobLevel features. Although there was a significant difference
between the average number of LinkedIn connections in the
two datasets, this feature did not have much information gain
associated with it due to the very large standard deviation.
V. DISCUSSION
In this paper, we attempted to utilize social features from
LinkedIn profiles of employees from 14 organizations, to
distinguish between spear phishing and non spear phishing
emails. We extracted LinkedIn profiles of 2,434 employees
who received a 4,742 targeted spear phishing emails; 5,914
employees who received 9,353 spam or phishing emails; and
1,240 Enron employees who received 6,601 benign emails.
We performed our analysis on a real world dataset from
Symantec’s enterprise email scanning service, which is one
of the biggest email scanning services used in the corporate
organizational level. Furthermore, we targeted our analysis
completely on corporate employees from 14 multinational
organizations instead of random real-world users. The impor-
tance of studying spear phishing emails in particular, instead
of general phishing emails, has been clearly highlighted by
Jagatic et al. [14]. We performed three classification tasks
viz. spear phishing emails versus spam / phishing emails,
spear phishing emails versus benign emails from Enron, and
spear phishing emails versus a mixture of spam / phishing
emails and benign Enron emails. We found that in two out
of the three cases, social features extracted from LinkedIn
profiles of employees did not help in determining whether an
email received by them was a spear phishing email or not.
Classification results from a combination of spam / phishing,
and benign emails showed some promise, where social features
were found to be slightly helpful. The depleted email feature
sets in this case, however, aided the enhancement in classifier
performance. We believe that it is safe to conclude that publicly
available content on an employee’s LinkedIn profile was not
used to send her targeted spear phishing emails in our dataset.
However, we cannot rule out the possibility of such an attack
outside our dataset, or in future. These attacks may be better
detected with access to richer social features. This methodol-
ogy of detecting spear phishing can be helpful for safeguarding
soft targets for phishers, i.e. those who have strong social
media footprint. Existing phishing email filters and products
can also exploit this technique to improve their performance,
and provide personalized phishing filters to individuals.
There can be multiple reasons for our results being non-
intuitive. Firstly, the amount of social information we were able
to gather from LinkedIn, was very limited. These limitations
have been discussed in Section III-C. It is likely that in a
real-world scenario, an attacker may be able to gain much
more information about a victim prior to the attack. This
could include looking for the victim’s profile on other social
networks like Facebook, Twitter etc., looking for the victim’s
presence on the Internet in general, using search engines
(Google, Bing etc.), and profiling websites like Pipl 14, Yasni 15
etc. The process of data collection by automating this behavior
was a time consuming process, and we were not able to take
this approach due to time constraints. Secondly, it was not clear
that which all aspect(s) of a user’s social profiles were most
likely to be used by attackers against them. We tried to use all
the features viz. textual information (summary and headline),
connectivity (number of connections), work information (job
level, and job type) and location information, which were made
available by LinkedIn API, to perform our classification tasks.
However, it is possible that none of these features were used
by attackers to target their victims. In fact, we have no way
to verify that the spear phishing emails in our dataset were
even crafted using features from social profiles of the victims.
These reasons, however, only help us in better understanding
the concept of using social features in spear phishing emails.
In terms of research contributions, this work is based on
a rich, true positive, real world dataset of spear phishing,
14https://pipl.com/
15http://www.yasni.com/
spam, and phishing emails, which is not publicly available. We
believe that characterization of this data can be very useful for
the entire research community to better understand the state-
of-the-art spear phishing emails that have been circulated on
the Internet over the past two years. To maintain anonymity
and confidentiality, we could not characterize this data further,
and had to anonymize the names of the 14 organizations we
studied. Also, after multiple reports highlighting and warning
about social media features being used in spear phishing, there
does not exist much work in the research community which
studies this phenomenon.
We would like to emphasize that the aim of this work is
not to try and improve the existing state-of-the-art phishing
email detection techniques based on their header, and content
features, but to see if the introduction of social media profile
features can help existing techniques to better detect spear
phishing emails. We believe that this work can be a first step
towards exploring threats posed by the enormous amount of
contextual information about individuals, that is present on
online social media. In future, we would like to carry out a
similar analysis using the same email dataset, with more social
features, which we were not able to collect in this attempt
due to time constraints. We would also like to apply more
machine learning and classification techniques like Support
Vector Machines, Stochastic Gradient boosting techniques etc.
on this dataset to get more insights into why social features
did not perform well.
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